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NO. 63 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Covid-19 and the Securitization of 
National Crises in Israel’s Strategic 
Approach 
Reliance on the Security Community As a “Comfortable Necessity” 
Gil Murciano 
Israel’s first response to the Covid-19 crisis demonstrated a security-based approach 
to a non-military national crisis. Faced with a first-of-its-kind non-military crisis of 
national magnitude, the government reactivated a pre-established, well-rehearsed 
policy protocol. It assigned the security community with the operational management 
of the crisis and responsibility over key strategic roles. Israel’s reliance on this commu-
nity is an outcome of both the health system’s weakness as well as an overarching mind-
set – shared by both the leadership and the public – that perceives the security commu-
nity as the optimal manager of national crises. This approach curtails the development 
of civilian crisis capacities and enhances future dependency on the security community 
in national crises. It bears consequences on Israel’s performance in future civilian crises: 
first, on its ability to devise an optimal response, second on its level of readiness to 
confront security threats during such crises, and third on public transparency. 
 
In its 72 years of existence, Israel has experi-
enced several national crises, from short 
events such as the 1967 War, to longer crises 
such as the Second Intifada (2000–2005). 
Nevertheless, the thread connecting these 
crises is that they were all of a military 
nature. Whether in the case of broad mili-
tary offensives, ballistic missiles, or terror 
attacks against its civilian population, the 
Israeli experience of national crises is solely 
based on human-made military challenges. 
The Covid-19 crisis therefore presents a first-
of-a-kind crisis in Israel’s history – a threat 
to public health as well as to its economic 
resilience, in which the national security 
dimension plays only a marginal role. 
The Securitization of the 
Covid-19 Crisis 
The concept of securitization relates to the 
attempt to reframe a range of non-military 
topics and agendas as matters of security. 
On the national level, securitization refers 
to the perception of threats through a con-
ceptual “widening” in which several sub-
jects of national importance are placed 
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under the category of national security. On 
the practical level, securitization is often 
used to provide legitimacy for the state 
to employ extraordinary means as well as 
raise the public’s sense of urgency. In the 
Covid-19 crisis, securitization is often men-
tioned in relation to the discourse used by 
leaders to describe the crisis and justify un-
usual measures. Israeli leaders have framed 
the Covid-19 pandemic as a national security 
crisis from its early phases: For example 
Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu 
defined the crisis as “a war against an in-
visible enemy.” These statements by the 
Israeli leadership are hardly unique. Leaders 
of other nations, including several Euro-
pean nations, have used the same discourse 
in their public appeals. 
Nevertheless, in the Israeli case, this defi-
nition of the crisis as a matter of national 
security had a direct operational implica-
tion. The Israeli approach transformed the 
security apparatus into a central compo-
nent of the national campaign to contain 
Covid-19 in the early phase. Using military 
forces to support civilian authorities in 
times of crisis is a common practice that 
has been utilized by several European coun-
tries during national crises, including the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the level 
of involvement of Israel’s security commu-
nity (SC) – the Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
the National Security Council (MALAL), the 
intelligence community, and the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) – differs from these 
European examples in principle. In most 
cases, the security apparatus’ involvement 
in Europe was limited to fulfilling auxiliary 
logistical roles such as transporting equip-
ment (France) or manning call centers (Ger-
many). In Israel, however, the security 
establishment took a leading role in crisis 
management during the initial phase, as 
well as responsibility over core strategic 
tasks that, in most countries, were fulfilled 
by public health professionals. Hence, 
Israel’s early response to the Covid-19 crisis 
demonstrated securitization, not simply in 
conceptual, but mainly in practical terms. 
The dominant role assigned to the security 
apparatus in this crisis can be considered an 
outcome of both necessity and preference. 
On the one hand, it emanates from the fun-
damental weakness of Israel’s civilian sys-
tems in dealing with national emergencies. 
This weakness is underscored when com-
pared to the vast organizational and techno-
logical capacities and experience accumu-
lated by the security apparatus for this pur-
pose through years of crisis management. 
Nevertheless, it also emanates from a mode 
of strategic thinking that tends to treat the 
SC as the most capable and reliable actor to 
deal with national crises, including non-mili-
tary events. The two dimensions – the weak-
ness of the civilian systems and reliance on 
the SC in national crises – are interlinked. 
Israel’s focus on the SC as a generic tool to 
manage non-military crises reduces the ur-
gency of building professionalized capacities 
for crises within the civilian system. This, 
in turn, perpetuates the weakness of civil-
ian organizations and necessitates using the 
security apparatus during national crises. 
Israel’s Reliance on the SC – 
A Mindset Rather Than an 
Ad-hoc Instinct 
“Decision-making (in the Covid-19 crisis) 
should not be based solely on health experts 
as they only see one aspect of the whole 
picture … (fighting) a pandemic requires 
a different perception and type of activity. 
It is a sort of medicine and war defused to-
gether” (Former Minister of Defense Naftali 
Bennet). 
At first glance, Israel’s turn toward the 
SC in the early phase of the crisis (Febru-
ary–June 2020) may appear as a reflexive 
measure. In this scenario, facing a strategic 
surprise, the leadership turned to the only 
body that had proved itself in previous 
crises – the security community. That may 
well have been the case in assigning the 
intelligence community with crisis-related 
duties. Nevertheless, when it comes to crisis 
management, the Israeli government ap-
pears to act on a pre-established logic that 
perceives the SC as the leading national 
resource to deal with civilian crises. 
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This mindset appeared in Israeli govern-
mental planning before the current out-
break. In 2007, in response to the avian flu 
outbreak, the government had prepared a 
national “readiness plan for the health sys-
tem for a flu pandemic.” This plan stated a 
clear division of labor between the SC and 
the health system during pandemics. The 
MOD was assigned the role of managing the 
crisis on the national level with the help of 
the National Emergency Authority (RACHEL) 
and the IDF’s Homefront Command. The 
Ministry of Health’s (MOH) responsibility 
was restricted mainly to the medical aspects 
of the crisis, such as managing the hospitals 
and health centers, clinical monitoring, and 
acquiring vaccines. Moreover, this approach 
was also demonstrated during the potential 
outbreak of the swine flu in 2009, when 
MALAL managed the effort to ensure the 
supply of vaccinations vis-à-vis their French 
counterparts. 
The preference to assign the SC to handle 
national crises of a civilian nature is appar-
ent in the gradual marginalization of Isra-
el’s National Emergency Authority (RACHEL). 
RACHEL was established in 2007 as a re-
sponse to the failure to adhere to civilian 
needs during the Second Lebanon War 
(2006). The aim was to create a hub of ex-
pertise in treating a broad range of civilian 
crises situations that has the capacity to 
plan, manage, and coordinate national 
efforts, both in preparation for and during 
national crises. Among the scenarios it was 
designed to confront are earthquakes, other 
natural disasters, and specifically also pan-
demics. Originally, RACHEL was meant to 
serve as an independent body subordinate 
to the PM or one of the ministries, but in 
2014 it was subordinated to the MOD. In 
the last few years, its organizational role 
was downgraded severely, as its core author-
ities over the allocation of resources and 
priority-setting in times of crisis were trans-
ferred to the IDF. This organizational mar-
ginalization led to the resignation of its 
director a few months before the Covid-19 
outbreak. 
Israel’s security-based approach to 
national crises can be attributed to four 
mindsets. First, it relates to Israel’s basic 
perception of pandemic threats. Viewing 
the SC as a natural candidate to manage 
pandemic outbreaks is partially based on 
the fact that much of the attention given in 
Israeli strategic thinking to pandemics has 
been devoted to the scenario of human-
made threats of biological warfare. In this 
context, one of the leading bodies in Israel 
that deals with pandemics on a daily basis 
is the Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), 
which was established in 1952 to “provide 
the State of Israel with scientific response to 
chemical and biological threats.” The mind-
set is also apparent in the government’s 
decisions to assign partial responsibility 
for the crisis management of pandemics to 
the Deputy Minister of Defense for Civil 
Defense (who is also in charge of IIBR) as 
part of his/her overall responsibility on non-
conventional warfare threats. Second, in the 
specific context of national crises, it can be 
attributed to Israel’s “strategic memory” – 
to the long history of military crises that 
have shaped the country’s leadership and 
public thinking about national crises as a 
whole. For Israelis, some of these military 
crises serve as more than simply national 
challenges: They are a part of what Brent 
Steele defined as “autobiographical narra-
tives” – the stories that shape a collective 
(as citizens of a nation) perception of “self.” 
This thinking was strongly demonstrated 
by the leadership’s discourse, which often 
related to the crisis as another war in the 
long chain of military conflicts, which 
Israel is compelled to “win.” Third, it relates 
to the underlying assumption embedded in 
the leadership’s mindset that management 
expertise of security threats can easily be con-
verted into non-military contexts. Whether 
in Israeli politics, business administration, 
or the public sector, senior SC members are 
considered to be natural candidates for top 
management positions based solely on their 
past security-related experience. Lastly, on 
the broad level, it can be attributed to a gen-
eral trend of securitizing matters of national 
importance in Israeli strategic thinking 
(e.g., the topics of Arab minority rights, 
demography, and migration). 
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The First Resort: Designating the 
SC as the Main Management Tool 
of the Covid-19 Crisis 
The Covid-19 crisis in Israel can be divided 
into two main phases (“waves”) demarked 
by two periods of drastic lockdown enacted 
by the government. The initial phase 
stretched from the appearance of the first 
cases and the first government restrictions 
on air travel (Feb. 21) to the gradual, yet 
comprehensive lockdown of economic and 
social activity (Mar. 19–25). However, the 
reopening of the education system and 
other social and economic segments led to 
a “second wave.” In its nadir, Israel had one 
of the highest rates of Covid-19 infections 
per capita in the world. This development 
led the government to implement a second 
major lockdown (September 18), which was 
partially eased in the second half of October. 
The leadership’s management approach 
in the early phase of the crisis was shaped 
by two main factors. First and foremost, it 
was motivated by Netanyahu’s ambition to 
keep decision-making under his tight con-
trol. While some observers saw this deci-
sion as being politically motivated, the logic 
behind the decision was explained by the 
need to act fast and decisively by circum-
venting bureaucratic procedures. Second, 
this approach was driven by the perception 
that the SC (in this case MALAL) is the most 
suitable operational system to manage a 
crisis of such magnitude, alongside MOH 
senior officials. 
The combination of these two factors 
resulted in the decision to manage the crisis 
through MALAL, which was officially tasked 
in early February by the PM with integrat-
ing and coordinating the campaign on the 
different levels of national activity. In this 
framework, key MOH officials (mainly the 
Director General) were deeply involved 
in the decision-making process. However, 
the role of operational integrator was given 
to MALAL. Directly subordinated to the 
PM and serving in peacetime mainly as the 
staff forum for the PM on strategic affairs, 
MALAL mostly (but not exclusively) deals 
with the more traditional sides of national 
security, i.e., the Israeli military, national 
resources, and diplomatic affairs. The major-
ity of its senior officials have served as 
senior members in the IDF and intelligence 
community. Although officially designated 
to deal with a wide range of strategic mili-
tary and civilian issues, since its founding 
in 1999, MALAL has dealt with pandemic 
scenarios only once (in 2009 – see above). 
Moreover, during the last decade, it has 
served mainly as an advisory body and not 
as an operational unit. Despite these defi-
ciencies, MALAL was assigned the crisis 
management role for the Covid-19 crisis. 
The decision to appoint MALAL to handle 
a pandemic is especially meaningful con-
sidering the fact that Israel has several civil-
ian bodies which, in theory, were designed 
to manage matters of public health in times 
of crisis. The decision to marginalize or 
ignore these bodies is not based solely on 
preference – it is also a matter of necessity 
deriving from the relative weakness of 
Israel’s civilian crisis capacities, especially 
in the health system. Years of budget cuts 
and transfers of authority have left these 
organizations relatively weak and curtailed 
their basic abilities to manage crises of a 
broad magnitude. RACHEL is a prime exam-
ple: Israel’s first large-scale civilian crisis 
should have been a defining moment for 
the organization that was established exactly 
for this purpose. Nevertheless, in this time 
of great need, the crisis found RACHEL in 
a precarious position, and the government 
abstained from using it, nor did it bother to 
appoint a new head to RACHEL during the 
first phase of the crisis. 
The same marginalization of civilian 
authorities in the context of crisis manage-
ment appears in the case of the MOH. Theo-
retically, the ministry has several units that 
deal directly with pandemic emergencies – 
among them the Ministry’s Emergency De-
partment and the Center for Disease Con-
trol. Nevertheless, in practice, these units 
were only partially operational, and their 
experts had a relatively marginal role in 
decision-making during the early phase. 
The systemic deficiencies of the health sys-
tem in dealing with crisis situations were 
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known to the heads of the MOH before the 
crisis, as became apparent during a national 
pandemic exercise that was conducted by 
RACHEL in 2019. However, very little was 
done to address them. 
The self-perceived role of the MOD in 
crisis management became apparent when 
former Minister of Defense Bennet launched 
his short-lived attempt to present a strategic 
long-term plan to contain Covid-19 (March 
2020). The plan called for the full transfer 
of authority over crisis management to the 
IDF and the MOD. The assumption that the 
Minister of Defense is the right person to 
deal with the strategic planning of the long-
term health crisis is yet another illustrative 
example of Israel’s security-based approach 
to national crises. 
In a later phase of the crisis, a certain 
change in the leadership’s mindset regard-
ing the need to appoint public health prac-
titioners to manage the crisis can be attri-
buted to the appointment (July 23) of Prof. 
Ronni Gamzu to the role of national Covid-
19 project coordinator. As a leading public 
health expert, Gamzu’s appointment can be 
seen as an attempt to shift from a generic to 
a specialized crisis management approach. 
Nevertheless, even in this case, the promi-
nence of the security-based mindset is appar-
ent in the fact that three of the five individ-
uals reportedly considered for the position 
were retired IDF generals with no previous 
public health experience. 
Public Approval of the Security 
Community’s Management Role 
The decision to assign a crisis management 
role to MALAL has been the subject of pub-
lic criticism since the early phase of the 
crisis. However, a closer look at this critical 
debate demonstrates the centrality of the 
SC as a tool of crisis management, not only 
in the leadership’s view, but also in public 
opinion. Public criticism mostly focused on 
Netanyahu’s decision to restrict decision-
making to his close circle and on MALAL’s 
limited ability to coordinate multiple ef-
forts. Nevertheless, relatively little attention 
was given in the Israeli media or the public 
debate to the decision (or rather the need) 
to hand over management authority of this 
non-military crisis to a national security 
unit. Instead, the debate was focused on 
which of the two components of the secu-
rity community – the MOD or the PM’s 
national security advisers (MALAL) – is 
more suitable to manage the crisis. For many 
of the country’s opinion leaders, the SC’s 
dominant role in civilian crisis manage-
ment was almost considered as a given. 
Moreover, because the SC – and the IDF 
specifically – generally enjoys a relatively 
high level of public trust, its involvement 
in this crisis is perceived by the public as a 
welcome development. In a recent survey 
(November 2020), 65% of Israelis expressed 
their wish for the IDF to manage the crisis. 
Repurposing SC Capacities: 
Reassigning the Health System’s 
Strategic Tasks to the Security 
Community 
The prominent role of the SC in crisis man-
agement appeared in the decision to assign 
its members with strategic duties and re-
sponsibilities that were originally designed to 
be handled by the health system. One prime 
example is passing operational responsibil-
ity for the crucial task of tracing and inter-
rupting the chain of Covid-19 infections to 
the MOD and the IDF (October 2020). In pre-
vious plans, this task was supposed to be 
carried out by the MOH. However, in reality, 
operational responsibility was transferred to 
the MOD while the MOH maintained only a 
regulatory role. For this purpose, the IDF’s 
Homefront command created a special com-
mand unit (“Alon”), which includes thou-
sands of analysts and soldiers, demonstrat-
ing once more the SC’s efficiency in provid-
ing fast solutions to close the operational 
gaps left by the civilian system. The com-
mand took over responsibility for tasks 
such as conducting epidemiological inves-
tigations and managing the isolation sites. 
Beyond compensating for the civilian 
system’s operational weakness, Israeli 
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leadership and senior SC officials sought 
to convert the community’s advanced tech-
nological capabilities and crisis expertise 
into assets in the Covid-19 crisis. This sys-
tematic effort was demonstrated by the 
creation (March 2020) of “the National 
Command Center to Fight Corona.” Led by 
the head of Mossad, Israel’s Institute for 
Intelligence and Special Tasks, this body 
aimed to utilize the advanced capabilities 
of Israel’s intelligence community in the 
fight against Covid-19. It dealt with a wide 
range of strategic tasks, including acquisi-
tion of necessary medical equipment, in-
creasing local production of crucial ma-
terials, and analysis of global trends and 
developments. Assigning Mossad the lead-
ing role in acquiring critical materials is 
an illustrative example of this “conversion” 
effort. In this case, Mossad’s international 
network and experience in working behind 
the scenes were used to ensure the coun-
try’s stockpile of necessary supplies in 
a competitive global reality of limited 
resources. 
The same idea of converting the SC’s 
expertise was utilized in the controversial 
decision to involve Israel’s General Security 
Service (Shabak) to identify citizens who 
had been in the vicinity of infected indi-
viduals. Shabak’s electronic surveillance 
capability to monitor the movements of 
terrorists was repurposed to interrupt the 
chain of infection. Shabak reportedly used 
its unique and highly secretive database 
of electronic data (known as the “Tool”), 
which, in coordination with other mecha-
nisms, became the main instrument to 
retrace the movements of infected indi-
viduals. Shabak’s utilization of its tracking 
capabilities vis-à-vis Israel’s general public, 
which was authorized (March 17, 2020) by 
the government under the special emergency 
regulations, has since been a topic of pub-
lic criticism and legal and parliamentary 
debate. In April 2020 it led several human 
rights organizations to make an appeal to 
the Israeli Supreme Court. The court ap-
proved Shabak’s monitoring in principle, 
but it limited the duration to one week, 
after which the government was required 
to regulate its activity through primary 
legislation. 
The SC’s cutting-edge technology was 
also utilized to the fullest through the in-
volvement of Israel’s Military Intelligence 
Directorate (AMAN). AMAN’s analysts have 
used their advanced intelligence analysis 
capabilities and software to integrate data 
from various sources and medical facilities, 
analyze infection patterns in Israel, and 
identify infection hubs. Much more than 
an auxiliary contribution, these actions by 
AMAN have had a direct effect on national 
policy. For example, it was AMAN’s analysts 
who first identified synagogues as hubs of 
infection – an insight that later resulted 
in the sensitive decision to limit prayer. In 
addition, AMAN has also assumed respon-
sibility for the analytical task of monitoring 
and informing decision-makers about 
global epidemiological developments and 
trends of the pandemic. 
Systemic Outcomes: 
A Reliance That Carries Multi-
layered Implications 
An initial analysis underscores the Israeli 
SC’s flexibility in adapting quickly to a new 
operational context by utilizing their capa-
bilities for the benefit of public health. In 
this context, the SC utilized the three main 
organizational advantages of the Israeli 
national security apparatus in times of na-
tional emergencies: centralized control, 
quick decision-making, and close proximity 
to decision-makers. These features were 
valuable in allowing Israel to act swiftly 
and decisively in the initial phase of the 
crisis. In fact, the contribution provided by 
the SC in the uncharted terrain of a pan-
demic was so comprehensive that one might 
forget that the task does not fall within their 
field of expertise in the first place. 
However, the Covid-19 crisis has provided 
unmistakable evidence of the systemic weak-
ness of Israel’s civilian crisis capacities, with 
emphasis on the public health system – 
in all matters related to operational capa-
bilities, let alone crisis management capabil-
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ities. Moreover, the MOH had to rely on the 
SC’s capabilities even for the execution of 
some of its key professional tasks, such as 
managing epidemiological investigations. 
National crises often serve as a litmus test 
to identify weak links in the system, which 
tend to collapse under sudden pressure. The 
Covid-19 crisis provides a clear indication 
of the limited ability of civilian authorities 
to manage a national crisis of global pro-
portions based on their own capacities. 
On the level of national mindset, Israeli 
reliance on the SC disincentivizes invest-
ment in civilian capacities for crisis situa-
tions. It therefore perpetuates the weakness 
of civilian organizations and necessitates 
using the SC in times of civilian crisis. On 
paper, Israel has several civilian bodies 
that were created to manage national pan-
demics. Nevertheless, in times of an actual 
health emergency, a lack of trust by the 
leadership, and years of undermining of 
authorities, in addition to cuts in resources 
crippled these units’ ability to act when 
they were needed most. 
The willful reliance on the SC to manage 
civilian crises has three main implications 
on Israel’s resilience in current and future 
national crises: first, on its ability to devise 
an optimal response to civilian crises; 
second on its level of readiness to confront 
security threats that are likely to appear 
during civilian national crises; and third on 
the level of public transparency and govern-
mental due process in times of crisis. 
The role assigned to the SC during a civil-
ian crisis indicates a “one solution fits all” 
approach, as it treats the multifaceted event 
of a civilian crisis as an event that can be 
managed with generic crisis management 
capacities. Nevertheless, similar to security 
crises, civilian crises require tailor-made ap-
proaches and adaptive solutions to chang-
ing needs. The marginalization of profes-
sional bodies that specialize in different 
types of civilian crises hinders Israel’s ability 
to mobilize and fully utilize relevant knowl-
edge sources in times of need. As the crisis 
is ongoing, it is difficult to assess the per-
formance of non-specialized SC units as 
crisis managers. However, initial signs indi-
cate that this model is suboptimal for the 
systematic incorporation of professional 
knowledge and experience. In this context, 
senior MOH officials have already criticized 
the SC’s lack of professional experience in 
health crisis management as well as in ful-
filling specific professional tasks. Never-
theless, this deficiency is not only related 
to the specific case of Covid-19 or that of 
pandemics – it is likely to impact Israel’s 
ability to cope with a broad range of civil-
ian crises, such as environmental or natural 
disasters. Each of these complex crisis sce-
narios requires a specialized and well-trained 
apparatus that allows a nation to fully uti-
lize its scientific and technological resources. 
Moreover, Israel’s security community 
has several structural disadvantages in 
managing large-scale civilian crises. First, 
the SC is built upon a hierarchal structure, 
whereas public engagement on the national 
level (and especially in public health crises) 
requires “horizontal” cooperation and dia-
logue with parallel systems. It necessitates 
close and simultaneous deliberation with 
several hubs on the sub-national level, 
such as municipalities, local health centers, 
the private sector, and workers’ unions – 
bodies and entities the SC has little experi-
ence engaging with during peacetime. 
Adjusting national efforts to this dynamic 
reality requires a deep understanding of 
legal, political, and bureaucratic processes. 
This SC deficiency became apparent in 
MALAL’s relative failure to cooperate with 
local authorities and adapt governmental 
decisions to different municipal contexts in 
the early phase of the crisis. Moreover, the 
SC is known to be somewhat of an outsider 
within the Israeli civil service. Operational 
limitations reduce the level of inter-minis-
terial interaction between the MOD and 
the civilian bodies in routine times, which 
curtails the SC’s relevance of serving as an 
integrator during a multi-layered civilian 
crisis involving several governmental units. 
Reliance on the SC during a national 
crisis on a global scale could hinder Israel’s 
level of readiness to deal with national 
security threats during national civil crises. 
Large-scale civilian crises, especially ones 
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of a global magnitude, are likely to have 
distinct implications for national security. 
As the Covid-19 pandemic has proven, 
global crises present an opportunity for 
regional actors to challenge the status quo. 
It is a period in which the country’s national 
resources are already stretched thin, and 
international attention is diverted else-
where. A combined threat whereby Israel 
could face a national security threat in 
addition to the non-military crisis is highly 
likely. The attempted cyber attack on Isra-
el’s water systems attributed to Iran (April 
2020) and Hamas’ recent threats to renew 
rocket attacks are two examples of such a 
predicament. Diverting the SC – in terms 
of both attention and resources – away 
from its core task of protecting national 
security increases the likelihood of organi-
zational overstretch in times of civilian 
crisis. In such a scenario, instead of protect-
ing Israel’s vulnerable flanks in precarious 
times, the SC might be tied up attempting 
to carry out the civilian authorities’ tasks 
for them. 
Lastly, based on the Covid-19 precedent, 
involving members of the Israeli security 
and intelligence community in strategic 
civilian tasks might limit the level of public 
transparency of policy planning and im-
plementation in times of national crises. 
This concern derives from the fact that, 
by nature, intelligence organizations, their 
tools, decisions, and activities are rarely 
exposed to public oversight. This concern 
is multiplied in regard to Shabak’s involve-
ment in the compulsory monitoring of the 
general public, as this task has direct impli-
cations on the civil liberties and right to 
privacy of Israeli citizens. Shabak’s moni-
toring sets a precedent in which capabilities 
that were designated to be directed at ex-
ternal enemies are being directed at Israeli 
citizens under the justification of special 
emergency regulations. As stated by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Esther 
Hayut (April 2020): “… redirecting tools 
that were developed to fight hostile entities 
against Israeli citizens … is a step that is 
likely to keep allies of democracy awake 
at night.” 
Conclusions 
Whereas in most developed countries 
Covid-19 crisis management was handled 
by professionals trained to manage health 
crises, in Israel the management – and 
some core strategic tasks – was handled 
mainly by the security apparatus during the 
early phase. The crisis has exposed the fact 
that Israel does not have an effective pro-
fessional equivalent to the Robert Koch In-
stitute in Germany or the Norwegian Insti-
tute of Public Health, let alone an inte-
grative body designed to deal with multiple 
crisis scenarios such as the US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
Instead, it has a security community that 
is perceived as both the main management 
tool and the trouble-shooter in civilian 
national crises. 
The strategic role assigned to Israel’s SC 
in the Covid-19 crisis is illustrative of the 
securitization of national crises in Israeli 
strategic thinking. In this context, this ap-
proach was not limited to one political 
group or professional segment of Israel’s 
policy circle, but rather appears to be a 
broad strategic narrative that has influenced 
the political leadership and public opinion 
leaders alike. It manifests as a shared, deep-
rooted approach to national crises that one 
might consider to be an item of strategic 
culture. 
Dr. Gil Murciano is an Associate in the research project “Israel and its regional and global conflicts: 
Domestic developments, security issues and foreign affairs.” The project is located within SWP’s Middle East 
and Africa Division and is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office. 
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